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E-mail: jenny.read@newcastle.ac.ukhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.04.038Social Evolution: Reciprocity There IsThe theory of cooperation predicts that altruism can be established by
reciprocity, yet empirical evidence from nature is contentious. Increasingly
though, experimental results from social vertebrates challenge the nearly
exclusive explanatory power of relatedness for the evolution of cooperation.Michael Taborsky
The theory of social evolution made
big leaps in the sixties and seventies
of the last century when behavioural
biologists started to apply rigorous
Darwinian thinking to the problems of
competition and cooperation among
conspecifics. William D. Hamilton
detected and formalized the crucial
importance of relatedness for the
evolution of cooperation [1], John
Maynard Smith developed evolutionary
game theory as a tool to understand
competitive interactions [2], and
Robert Trivers figured out how
cooperationmight evolve also between
unrelated social partners by reciprocal
altruism, if received help enhances
the recipient’s cooperativeness [3].
Some forty years and hundreds of
studies later, there is consensus
among theoreticians and empiricists
that assortment by relatedness is
of paramount importance for
the evolution of cooperative and
competitive behaviour. There is
general conviction also that animals
cooperating or competing for
resources use decision rules optimized
by natural selection that can be
adequately modelled with the help of
evolutionary game theory. In contrast,
there is less agreement about
the importance of reciprocity for
understanding interactions amongsocial partners. It has been questioned
whether situations in nature are
favourable for reciprocal altruism
to evolve [4]. Nevertheless, new
evidence from vampire bats shows
that reciprocal exchange can indeed
be more important for cooperation
than relatedness [5].
It is easy to understand the grave
doubts about the evolution of
cooperation by reciprocity. Helping
is costly to donors and beneficial to
recipients, which reflects the essential
meaning of altruistic behaviour;
therefore, selection favours free-riders
accepting help without return [3].
However, reciprocity can generate
evolutionarily stable cooperation
if costly help sufficiently increases
the likelihood that donors obtain
fitness benefits in return for helping,
provided that the benefits more than
compensate for the costs of initial
investment. This means that the benefit
from being helped must on average
exceed the cost of helping, and
that social interactions should be
sufficiently frequent. At the proximate,
mechanistic level, reciprocity involves
considering information about the
likelihood of getting adequate returns
of any help provided to a social partner.
Such information can be obtained from
experience of previous interactions
and can generate one of three decision
rules: first, in the simplest case, anindividual will become more helpful
if it received help. This rule — ‘help
anyone if helped by someone’ — can
generate evolutionarily stable levels of
cooperation in a population [6,7], and
such ‘generalized reciprocity’ is known
to operate in rats and humans [8,9].
Second, if social partners interact
repeatedly with each other, having
received previous help from your social
partner can make the recipient more
helpful. This rule — ‘help someone who
has helped you before’ — can again
spawn stable cooperation [10], and
experiments showed that such ‘direct
reciprocity’ can be applied at least by
mammals and birds [11–13]. Third,
individuals might help a social partner
depending on its helpfulness towards
others, even if they themselves never
received any help. Such ‘indirect
reciprocity’ based on the reputation
of social partners can create stable
cooperation if individuals are capable
of using the respective information [14],
but the underlying decision rule ‘help
someone who is helpful’ has been
experimentally demonstrated only
in humans [15].
To test which (if any) of these
reciprocity mechanisms animals
employ requires careful
experimentation. Whether such
mechanisms apply also in nature
is an altogether different question.
Cooperation among animals in the
wild becomes particularly interesting
if shown among unrelated individuals,
because then its evolution cannot be
explained by kin selection [1]. One
prominent textbook example is the
donation of blood among conspecifics
in vampire bats (Figure 1). As Gerald
Wilkinson had observed in a natural
Figure 1. The common vampire bat (Desmodus rotundus).
Vampire bats are known to donate blood to conspecifics. New work shows that reciprocity
rather than relatedness is the foundation of this example of altruism (photo: iStockphoto,
10-29-08 ªMichael Lynch).
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Figure 2. Costs and benefits of blood sharing in vampire bats.
(A) The loss of reserves in vampire bats follows a negative exponential function. For this
reason, the amount of blood delivered by a donor has a smaller effect on its risk of starvation
than it has on the receiver’s risk of starvation (Adapted from [16] with permission from Nature
Publishing Group). (B) Predictors of food donated to a starved social partner. The relative
explanatory power is shown for the variables: food and allogrooming previously received
from the recipient, the donor’s sex, the relatedness between donor and recipient, and the
interaction between food received and relatedness (hatched). The complete statistical model
explained 37.2% of the variation in donated food, with significant effects of food received,
allogrooming received, donor sex, and the interaction between food received and relatedness,
but no significant effect of relatedness itself. After data provided in [5].
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R487population of Desmodus rotundus in
the early eighties, individuals in need
of a blood meal receive the required
donation not only from relatives, but
also from individuals they have helped
in a similar way before [16]. Wilkinson
showed elegantly that the conditions
for the evolution of such reciprocal
exchange are favourable in these bats,
because the costs and benefits of
sharing blood are asymmetrical
(Figure 2). A bat that has found a victim
to bleed has plenty of precious blood to
share with a companion. An unlucky
starveling can thereby greatly increase
its chances to survive until the next
successful foray. As expected from the
structure of bat groups, most transfers
of blood occur between related
roost mates, primarily reflecting
maternal care. However, occasionally
non-relatives were observed to
exchange blood, and in four out of
six cases in which reciprocation was
experimentally enabled in a small
captive group, previous blood
donations were reciprocated more
often than expected by chance.
The interpretation that reciprocity
explained these donations has been
challenged, however, because of
the rather few observations of blood
donations among non-relatives,
and alternative explanations for
this apparent reciprocal altruismwere proposed [4]. Sure, reciprocity
can be an important proximate
mechanism underlying exchanges
among relatives as well, but is such
exchange a result of selection for
reciprocal altruism, a product of kin
selection, or is cooperation evenenforced by demanding receivers? This
question has been tackled in a recent
study by Gerald Wilkinson and Gerald
Carter [5]. They starved 20 common
vampire bats experimentally and
induced blood sharing in a laboratory
colony consisting of related and
unrelated roost mates. They found that
across blood donation dyads, food
previously received from a partner
predicted donations 8.5 times better
than relatedness. In fact, food received,
allogrooming (i.e. grooming by another
individual) received and the donor’s
sex predicted the presence of food
sharing in 312 measured dyads,
but relatedness did not (Figure 2).
Relatedness did affect the positive
correlation between food donated
and food previously received, although
in an unexpected direction; dyads
of related individuals showed even
higher symmetrical reciprocation
than unrelated ones, which was
apparently mainly due to frequent
bilateral exchanges of blood between
mothers and offspring. In contrast,
coercion by prospective receivers
did not explain altruistic donations.
Fasted bats were usually fed by four
donors, which in total made up for
about 20% of the mass lost during
previous starvation. Furthermore, food
sharing networks remained stable over
the six month test period, and the
amounts given and received correlated
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R488positively both for blood donations
and for allogrooming. These long-term
associations between individual bats
seem to be stabilized also by frequent
reciprocal grooming. Frequent dyadic
interactions ensure favourable
conditions for direct reciprocity.
Whether bats use decision rules of
direct or generalized reciprocity was
not tested, however, because this
would require manipulation of both the
helping experience and the identity of
the helper [13].
One might ask how unique this kind
of reciprocal sharing is among animals
in nature. Food sharing occurs also
in many other species, particularly in
primates [17], but the most frequent
reciprocal interactions observed in
nature involve grooming [4]. It has
been argued that allogrooming might
be too ‘cheap’ to classify as altruistic
behaviour, but several studies have
shown that such hygienic behaviour
does involve considerable costs,
including time effort, energy
expenditure, and risk of predation
and parasite transmission [18].
Furthermore, reciprocal aid is often
not confined to one commodity, as
demonstrated in vampire bats and
many primates, where grooming is
exchanged for other amenities such
as access to food or partners [5,17].
Reciprocal commodity trading
may be much more frequent than
currently assumed, both between
related and unrelated social partners.
It can explain, for instance, that in
cooperatively breeding cichlids,unrelated helpers invest more in
altruistic brood care than related
ones, thereby paying for access to
resources and a safe territory [19].
In contrast to vampire bats, here
relatedness was shown to reduce the
propensity of individuals to cooperate.
The difficulty of demonstrating
the components of reciprocity
experimentally and in a nearly natural
context is probably mainly responsible
for the fact that reciprocal altruism has
yet received comparably little attention
as an evolutionary mechanism
responsible for cooperation [20].
However, as the study of vampire
bats suggests [5], we should not
thoughtlessly reject the possibility of
reciprocal altruism occurring among
social partners in nature— the absence
of evidence should not be mistaken for
evidence of absence [17].References
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